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I Comments

I

What Ann Arbor Could Learn From Ulster:
The Implementation of the MacBride
Principles to American Higher Education
Admissions
Matthew S. Draper*
Ever so subtly, without even alluding to the last obstacles preserved
by earlier opinions that we now push out of our path, we effectively
replace the goal of a discrimination free society with the quite
incompatible goal of proportionate representation by race and sex.'
1.

Introduction
Affirmative action programs 2 in the United States, specifically as

* 2005 Recipient of Penn State's Richard Reeve Baxter Award for outstanding
legal scholarship and student comment in the field of international law. J.D. Candidate,
The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, 2006; B.A. Bucknell
University, 2003. I am indebted to my wife, Louisa, for her constant support and candor.
Further, Jonathan Andrews, Michael Kaplan, and Marcy McCullough of the Penn State
Law Review and Rachael Goldfarb of the Penn State InternationalLaw Review provided
valuable critiques to drafts of this piece. Finally, I would like to thank Lee, Kathy, and
Kevin Draper for engaging in the discussions that sparked the idea for this Comment.
1. Johnson v. Transp. Agency 480 U.S. 616, 658 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. The label "affirmative action programs" is admittedly broad and encompasses a
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applied to admissions at institutions of higher education, are the subject
of intense discourse and disagreement. This uniquely American dilemma
presents questions made exceedingly complex by the nation's long
history of racial divisiveness. Issues of racial equality present some of
the more significant problems in American society today and import a
multitude of considerations ripe with legal, philosophical, and moral
importance.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Grutterv. Bollinger3
has rekindled the great debate surrounding race-conscious admissions
policies in American colleges and universities. The Court's Grutter
decision enabled colleges and universities across the nation to continue
the "use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest
in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body."4 The American public's reaction to the Grutter decision has been
polemic. 5 Interestingly, both sides of the affirmative action debate have
7
claimed that the case 6 represented progress for their respective causes.
variety of systems. For the purposes of this Comment, I intend the term "affirmative
action" to mean any admissions program that functions to provide a minority applicant a
greater chance of admission than a similarly or better qualified white applicant.
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. Id. at 343.
5. Compare Shelby Steele, A Victory For White Guilt, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2003,
at A16, [hereinafter White Guilt], with Eric Slater, Supreme Court Rulings; Day of
Celebration in Michigan City at Center of Court Debate; Students at Ann Arbor
university laud the Supreme Court's ruling upholding the law school's affirmative action
policy, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A16. Mr. Steele's piece, which derides Justice
O'Connor's Grutter opinion as being full of "euphemistic, unexamined, and empty
language," argues that Grutteris best understood not through legal principles; instead, the
Court's decisions in the realm of affirmative action can be attributed to notions of "moral
accountability" or "white guilt." White Guilt, supra. This "white guilt," Mr. Steele
argues, has caused American institutions of higher education to "engineer the visibility of
black and brown faces," and for the Supreme Court to allow such social engineering
programs to exist. Id.
In stark contrast, Mr. Slater's article uses extensive quotes from those who viewed
Grutter as justly decided to illustrate the apparently prevalent feelings in Ann Arbor after
the decision was handed down. Day of Celebration, supra. The true feelings at the
University of Michigan, however, may be slightly different than those which were
depicted in the news coverage of the Grutter ruling. One person that Mr. Slater spoke
with noted, "If you're out and about talking against affirmative action or the university,
you'll definitely get funny looks." Id. This observation illustrates the chilling effect of
what Mr. Steele termed feelings of "moral accountability" on free and honest discussion.
See White Guilt, supra.
6. Grutter was announced with a companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003). While Grutter challenged the University of Michigan Law School's admissions
practices, Gratz was a challenge to Michigan's undergraduate system of admissions. Id.
at 249-50. The Supreme Court struck down the undergraduate system, specifically
because the allotment of "points," based on race alone, in a system in which a certain
number of points are required for admission, is not narrowly tailored. See id. at 269-70.
While most critics of race-conscious policies believe that Gratz represents a step towards
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While many scholars have called for the total abandonment of race
as a factor in American higher education admissions, 8 others have argued
that colleges and universities must continue to consider race due to the
lingering effects of racism and segregation on minority applicants. 9
While proponents of both of these positions raise many valid points in
support of their respective arguments for and against race-conscious
admissions policies, debates on affirmative action in the United States
often give rise to more questions than answers. As Richard D.
Kahlenberg, a Fellow at the Center for National Policy, in Washington,
D.C., notes, these diametrically opposed arguments "fail to address the
strong moral, legal, and political dilemmas posed in the affirmative
action debate."'
Due in large part to the fervent nature of affirmative action
discourse in the United States, especially with regard to the policy's use
in higher education admissions, the possibility of reaching any sort of
"middle ground" is rarely considered. This comment seeks to explore a
possible "middle ground" solution often overlooked by both critics and
The MacBride
proponents of race-conscious admissions policies.
practices by
employment
Principles," which seek to end discriminatory
ending affirmative action, there is some consensus that Grutter represents a step
Linda Chavez, founder and president of the Equal
backwards for their cause.
Opportunity Center, believes that the Supreme Court "punted on the opportunity to once
and for all get government out of the business of deciding winners and losers on the basis
of skin color." Joan Biskupic and Mary Beth Marklein, Court upholds use of race in
university admissions; But justices ban use of automaticpoints in rating applicants,USA
TODAY, June 24, 2003, at Al, [hereinafter Biskup and Marklein]. Conversely, Mary Sue
Coleman, the president of the University of Michigan, cast the rulings in a much different
light, saying, "This is a huge win for higher education." Id.
7. "Critics of affirmative action cast the rulings as a split decision, and said large
public universities that receive several thousand applications a year would have a hard
time replacing admissions point systems with the more personal assessments required by
Monday's rulings." Biskupic and Marklein, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Larry Alexander, et al., Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), at 2003 WL 164181.
9. See Leland Ware, From Brown to Grutter: Affirmative Action and Higher
Education in the South, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2097, 2114 (2004). See generally Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the
Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1060 (1992) (arguing in favor of affirmative action
and quotas systems and further asserting that "quotas present the most efficacious method
of remedying the past effects of discrimination").
10. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037,
1037 (1996).
11. Father Sean McManus, The MacBride Principles: The Essence, at
http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/pages/MacBride/MacBride%20Principles%20The%2
OEssence.htm (last visited on Jan. 15, 2005). The Principles provide as follows (the 1986
"amplifications" by Sean MacBride appear in plain text):
1. Increasing the representation of individuals from underrepresented religious
groups in the work force, including managerial, supervisory, administrative,
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clerical, and technical jobs.
A work force that is severely unbalanced may indicate prima facie that full
equality of opportunity is not being afforded all segments of the community in
Northern Ireland.
Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make every reasonable lawful
effort to increase the representation of underrepresented religious groups at all
levels of its operations in Northern Ireland.
2. Adequate security for the protection of minority employees both at the
workplace and while travelling to and from work.
While total security can be guaranteed nowhere today in Northern Ireland, each
signatory to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith efforts
to protect workers against intimidation and physical abuse at the workplace.
Signatories must also make reasonable good faith efforts to ensure that
applicants are not deterred from seeking employment because of fear for their
personal safety at the workplace or while travelling to and from work.
3. The banning of provocative religious or political emblems from the
workplace.
Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith
efforts to prevent the display of provocative sectarian emblems at their plants in
Northern Ireland.
4. All job openings should be publicly advertised and special recruitment
efforts should be made to attract applicants from underrepresented religious
groups.
Signatories to the MacBride Principles must exert special efforts to attract
employment applications from the sectarian community that is substantially
underrepresented in the workforce. This should not be construed to imply a
diminution of opportunity for other applicants.
5. Layoff, recall and termination procedures should not, in practice, favour
particular religious groups.
Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith
efforts to ensure that layoff, recall, and termination procedures do not penalize
a particular religious group disproportionately.
Layoff and termination
practices that involve seniority solely can result in discrimination against a
particular religious group if the bulk of employees with greatest seniority are
disproportionately from another religious group.
6. The abolition of job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions, and differential
employment criteria, which discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic
origin.
Signatories to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith efforts
to abolish all differential employment criteria whose effect is discrimination on
the basis of religion. For example, job reservations and apprenticeship
regulations that favour relatives of current or former employees can, in
practice, promote religious discrimination if the company's workforce has
historically been disproportionately drawn from another religious group.
7. The development of training programmes that will prepare substantial
numbers of current minority employees for skilled jobs, including the
expansion of existing programmes and the creation of new programmes to
train, upgrade and improve the skills of minority employees.
This does not imply that such programmes should not be open to all members
of the workforce equally.
8. The establishment of procedures to assess, identify, and actively recruit
minority employees with potential for further advancement.
This section does not imply that such procedures should not apply to all
employees equally.
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foreign companies who conduct business in Northern Ireland, 12 provide
American colleges and universities with an excellent model for an
admissions system which represents a compromise between extremists
on both sides of the American affirmative action debate.
This comment is comprised of four main parts. Part I of the
comment will serve as an introduction to the thesis of the comment that
will be later explored in much greater detail. Part II will examine three
major U.S. Supreme Court cases that have shaped the current American
policy of affirmative action in higher education admissions, analyze the
language of those decisions in an attempt to understand where the
American judiciary presently stands on the issue, and then examine the
academic critiques of both the case law and current policies. Part III will
trace the history of the MacBride Principles, beginning with the wellacknowledged Catholic repression at the hands of the Protestant majority
in Northern Ireland, on through the lobbying efforts of the Irish National
Caucus in Washington, D.C., and into their present day form and effect
on both Catholic employment in Northern Ireland and the American
corporations doing business there. Finally, Part IV of the comment will
explore the possibility of the theoretical implementation of an American
higher education admissions program based on the philosophy and
ideology embodied in the MacBride Principles.13 Further, Part IV will
argue that a MacBride-based program would provide an excellent
transition from the current affirmative action programs to a future in
which race-conscious policies are no longer necessary in American
14
higher education.
II.

Affirmative Action in American Higher Education Today

Perhaps no topic in America causes as much dissension, both
among American legal intelligentsia and in the public at large, as
9. The appointment of a senior management staff member to oversee the
company's affirmative action efforts and the setting up of timetables to
carry out affirmative action Principles.
Id. In addition to the above, each signatory to the MacBride Principles is required to
report annually to an independent monitoring agency on its progress in the
implementation of these Principles. Id.
12. See Neil J. Conway, Investment Responsibility in Northern Ireland: The
MacBride Principlesof FairEmployment, 24 LOY. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002).
13. Such a hypothetical admissions program, comprised of points based on the
MacBride Principles that are relevant in the educational context, is referred to in this
comment alternately as a "MacBride-based approach" or a "MacBride-based program."
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion clearly indicated the Court's sentiment that the need for affirmative action
programs will wane in the coming years, writing "We expect that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today." Id.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

affirmative action. One of the policy's most contentious areas of
application is to admissions decisions at institutions of higher education,
both at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Three cases have come to
define American jurisprudence with respect to affirmative action in this
arena: Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 15 Hopwood v.
Texas,16 and Grutter v. Bollinger.'7 The opinions in these cases serve to

highlight the enormity of the struggles faced by a legal system seeking to
acknowledge and rectify past injustice, while at the same time confined
by the parameters set forth by the U.S. Constitution and other pieces of
civil rights legislation. 8 Scholars have critiqued all three decisions on a
variety of grounds, 19 and the American public seems generally
dissatisfied with the policy that these decisions have spawned.20
In order to proffer a possible solution to such a weighty problem it
is imperative to understand exactly what each of these decisions stands
for, and how each successive case modified its predecessor, so that the
well-intentioned can avoid the trappings of past predicaments and the
failures of previous policy makers.
A.

Regents of University California v. Bakke

Until recently, the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke 2' had
governed issues of race-conscious admissions policies in American
education.2 2 In Bakke, the University of California at Davis (UC-Davis)
15. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256. (5th Cir 2000), cert. denied, Texas v.
Hopwood, 533 U.S. 929 (2001).
17. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
18. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000a.
19. For a critique of Bakke, see Gabriel Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of
Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 881, 881 (1996) (arguing Bakke is
"incoherent" due to the opinion's failure to actually define diversity). For a critique of
Hopwood, see Philip T.K. Daniel, Kyle Edward Timken, The Rumors of My Death May
Have Been Exaggerated:Hopwood's Error in "Discarding"Bakke, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 391,
399 (1999) (arguing that Hopwood was wrongly decided due to its failure to follow
precedent). For a critique of Grutter, see David Crump, The Narrow TailoringIssue In
the Affirmative Action Cases: Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Approval In Gratz and
Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making By Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV.
483, 485 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court engaged in "weak and unpersuasive"
narrow tailoring analysis).
20. In an NBC News/ Wall Street Journalpoll conducted by Peter Hart and Robert
Teeter on Jan. 19-21, 2003, and, 65% of the sample taken opposed the use of race as a
factor in admissions decisions in public universities, while only 26% favored such use.
This poll is far from an anomaly. In a Time/CNN poll conducted Jan. 15-16. 2003, by
Harris Interactive, 54% of the sample disapproved of preferential admissions programs
which favor minorities, while only 39% approved. Race and Ethnicity Polls, at
http://www.pollingreport.com/race.htm (last visited on Jan. 15, 2005).
21. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1978).
22. See Corinne E. Anderson, Comment, A Current Perspective; The Erosion of
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Medical School denied named Allan Bakke, a white male with strong
academic credentials, 23 admission to the Medical School of for two
consecutive years.2 4 Following his second rejection, Bakke filed suit
against the Medical School. Bakke alleged, among other things, that the
26
special admissions program 25 in place for minority applicants
functioned as an exclusionary barrier to his admission,2 7 and violated his
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.28

Affirmative Action in UniversityAdmissions, 32 AKRON L. REv. 181, 192 (1999).
23. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. In fact, an interviewer at UC-Davis Medical School
who met with Alan Bakke termed him "a very desirable applicant to [the] medical
school." Id.
24. Id. at 276-77.
25. Id. at 277-78. It is interesting to note that part of the proffered rationale behind
the special admissions program implemented at the UC-Davis Medical School at the time
of Bakke's application (and subsequent rejection) was that minority applicants should
receive credit for overcoming "disadvantage." Id. at 276. Exactly what "disadvantage"
minority applicants had actually overcome, and why such logic was limited to minority
applicants, was not explained.
26. Id. at 274. Justice Powell's opinion noted that the Medical School considered
"Blacks," "Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indians" to be under this "minority"
umbrella of preference.
27. Id. at 277. The following charts, included in the Bakke opinion, illustrate the
stark difference in academic credentials of those applicants admitted under the "regular"
admissions program, as opposed to those admitted under the "special" program.
Class Entering in 1973
MCAT (percentiles)
SGPA OGPA Verbal Quantitative Science
3.44 3.46
96
94
97

Bakke ............
Average of
regular
admittees ........ 3.51
Average of
special
admittees ....
... 2.62

Gen.
Infor.
72

3.49

81

76

83

69

2.88

46

24

35

33

Class Entering in 1974
MCAT (percentiles)
Gen.
SGPA OGPA Verbal Quantitative Science Infor.
3.44
3.46
96
94
97
72

Bakke .............
Average of
regular
admittees ..........
3.36
Average of
special
admittees .......... 2.42
Id.
28. Id. at 266.

3.29

69

67

82

72

2.62

34

30

37

33
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Writing for a fractured majority, Justice Powell condemned the
system utilized at UC-Davis for its use of quotas in admissions
decisions, 29 but allowed for modified forms of affirmative action to
continue to function by determining that the "state has a substantial
interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions
program., 30 Scholars have noted that this "substantial interest" may be
served by programs that utilize race as "one of many factors to create
diversity in 3the
class for purposes of improving the learning
1
environment.,
Interestingly, the opinion predicted the problems that would evolve
in American jurisprudence in the affirmative action arena. Justice
Powell prophetically noted that programs where race serves as merely
one of many factors in making admissions decisions could conceivably
function as thinly-veiled duplications of the UC-Davis program, of which
the Court had just explicitly disapproved.32 In essence, Justice Powell
acknowledged that colleges and universities across the country could, if
they so desired, continue quota programs while simply using the new and
preferred nomenclature:
"factors."
However, in response to this
hypothetical assertion, Justice Powell noted that the Supreme Court
would refuse to presume that a university would undertake such
deceptive measures to circumvent the spirit of the Bakke ruling.33
Writing separately, Justice Blackmun raised several important
points in his concurrence that were not adequately addressed by the
29. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. Justice Powell wrote, "[iut is evident that the Davis
special admissions program involves the use of an explicit racial classification never
before countenanced by this Court..." and deemed the program's "fatal flaw" as "its
disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
30. Id,
31. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A CriticalAnalysis, 41 Hous. L.
REv. 459, 461 (2004).
32. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. Indeed, in a passage that would prove rather prophetic,
Justice Powell wrote, "It has been suggested that an admissions program which considers
race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated-but no less effectivemeans of according racial preference than the Davis program." Id. Justice Powell
attempted to distance the UC-Davis program from programs at institutions such as
Harvard (who along with Stanford, Penn and Columbia filed an amicus brief in support
of Davis), writing, "A facial intent to discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner's
preference program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity exists in an
admissions program [such as the program employed at Harvard] where race or ethnic
background is simply one element-to be weighed fairly against other elements-in the
selection process." Id. at 317-18. Justice Powell's assertion that the Harvard approach
would likely pass Constitutional muster gave rise to programs such as the one at the
University of Michigan, which today employs a factor based approach. See University of
Michigan Undergraduate Admissions 2004-2005 Applications, Guidelines, and Process,
at http://www.admissions.umich.edu/process/review/categories/#attributes (last visited
Jan. 15, 2005).
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
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majority opinion.3 4 As a general observation, Justice Blackmun noted
the irony in the fact that the uproar raised over race-conscious
admissions policies in America is conspicuously absent from programs
such as legacy preferences and athletic admissions."
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Justice Blackmun's opinion
is his foresight in predicting the legal battleground of the future.3 6
Justice Blackmun, in dictum, acknowledged that the difference between
the UC-Davis program, which the Court condemned in Bakke, and the
Harvard program that the Court looked upon with favor was not "very
profound or constitutionally significant., 37 The Court had drawn "a thin
and indistinct ' 38 line between the purportedly acceptable and
unacceptable, and challenges to such a vague and indefinite policy would
invariably come before the Court.
B.

Hopwood v. Texas

The rationale behind Bakke was dealt a significant blow by the Fifth
Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas,39 a case which the Supreme Court later
34. Id. at 402 (noting, in relevant part, that Justice Blackmun felt his opinion served
to "add only some general observations that hold particular significance for me, and then
a few comments on equal protection."
35. Id. at 404 (Blackmun, J., concurring). As Justice Blakmun noted:
It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a program where race
is an element of consciousness, and yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that
institutions of higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate than the
graduate level, have given conceded preferences up to a point to those
possessed of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to the affluent who may
bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those having connections with
celebrities, the famous, and the powerful.
Id. at 404.
36. Id. at 406. Justice Blackmun argued forcefully on this point, noting:
I am not convinced, as Mr. Justice POWELL seems to be, that the difference
between the Davis program and the one employed by Harvard is very profound
or constitutionally significant. The line between the two is a thin and indistinct
one. In each, subjective application is at work. Because of my conviction that
admission programs are primarily for the educators, I am willing to accept the
representation that the Harvard program is one where good faith in its
administration is practiced as well as professed. I agree that such a program,
where race or ethnic background is only one of many factors, is a program
better formulated than Davis' two-track system. The cynical, of course, may
say that under a program such as Harvard'sone may accomplish covertly what
Davis concedes it does openly. I need not go that far, for despite its two-track
aspect, the Davis program, for me, is within constitutional bounds, though
perhaps barely so.
Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir 2000), cert. denied, Texas v.
Hopwood, 533 U.S. 929 (2001). For an excellent critique of the Fifth Circuit's rationale
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denied certiorari. 4° In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit struck down the
University of Texas Law School's affirmative action program, which
used race as a "factor" in determining which students were granted
admission.4 1 Four white Texas residents applied and were denied
admission to the University of Texas Law School.4 2 Those students
argued that their denial from the Law School was attributable to the
lowered standards under which minority applicants were granted
admission.43
In explaining its rationale in striking down the University of Texas
Law School's plan, the Hopwood court specifically noted that the Bakke
rhetoric regarding diversity as a compelling governmental interest,
championed by Justice Powell44 and oft-cited as support for affirmative
action,4 5 was not joined by any other justice.4 6 As a result, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that no controlling rationale regarding what
circumstances warrant the use of racial preferences had actually emerged

in Hopwood,see Victor V. Wright, Note, Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Engages
in Suspect Compelling Interest Analysis in Striking Down An Affirmative Action
Admissions Program, 34 HOus. L. REV. 871, (1997). Wright argues that the Supreme
Court could have found the University of Texas program unconstitutional without
eviscerating the rule of law set forth in Bakke. See id. at 875.
40. Hopwood, 236 F.3d 256.
41. At the time of the Hopwood suit, the University of Texas Law School utilized
the Texas Index, or "TI," score, calculated by the Law School Data Assembly Service, or
"LSDAS," to determine admission. The TI took into account both the applicant's Law
School Admission Test (LSAT) score and undergraduate GPA. As in the UC-Davis
program that was unequivocally struck down in Bakke, the University of Texas Law
School required TI scores much lower for a "minority" applicant's admission than those
required for a white applicant's admission. Id. at 265. Interestingly, the Law School's
definition of the word "minority" encompassed only African Americans and Mexican
Americans. Id. at n.29. This definition of "minority" is much more restrictive than that
employed by UC-Davis at the time of Bakke. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 276 (1978).
42. Hopwood, 236 F.3d at 265.
43. The University of Texas Law School's admissions criteria for minority and
nonminority applicants was starkly different: a non-minority applicant needed a TI score
of at least 192 to simply become a "discretionary" zone candidate. Minority applicants,
on the other hand, needed a TI score of only 179 to be deemed "discretionary." Id.
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19.
45. See, e.g., Danielle R. Holley, NarrativeHighground: The Failureof Intervention
as a ProceduralDevice in Affirmative Action Litigation, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103,
104-5 (2003) (noting how "well known" the "diversity" justification is in terms of
rationalizing and justifying race-conscious affirmative action programs).
46. Hopwood, 236 F.3d at 275 n.66. In fact, the Fifth Circuit noted that:
"the same four [justices who joined Powell in holding that the "State has a
substantial interest that may be legitimately served by a properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin"] disagreed with him as to the rationale that is necessary to justify
constitutionally the government's use of racial preferences."
Id. at 274.
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from Bakke.47 This perceived lack of direction from the Supreme Court
in Bakke left the nation's lower courts "free to determine which among
offered by the justices in Bakke is
the competing rationales
48
constitutionally valid.,
C. Grutter v. Bollinger
After the Hopwood decision, critics of race-conscious admissions
policies were hopeful that the Supreme Court would use Grutterto sound
affirmative action's death knell. The Supreme Court agreed to hear
49
Grutterdue to a split of authority between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits;
the Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood, denied the constitutionality of race-based
admissions,5 ° while the Sixth Circuit had approved such policies,
47. Id. at 275. But see Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir.
2000). In a reverse discrimination case (again regarding the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions programs) the Ninth Circuit determined that the University of
Washington Law School's admissions program did not violate Title VI or the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the outcome of the case is interesting in and of itself, the rationale
for the decision merits separate exploration.
In coming to a conclusion regarding the UW program's constitutionality, the court
posited that because Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke embraced the use of racial
preference programs whose "articulated purpose [was] remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination," Justice Brennan and those who joined his opinion "approved of
'race-conscious programs' which sought to eradicate 'disparate racial impact."' Id. at
1198.
Perhaps even more brashly, the Ninth Circuit determined that Justice Brennan and
those who joined his opinion "would have accepted an even more expansive use of racial
factors than that permitted in Justice Powell's opinion." Id. at 1199 (emphasis added).
That a circuit court would utilize such seemingly unfounded suppositions, full of
conjecture and unsupported assertions, is quite surprising.
Indeed, a close reading of Bakke reveals that Justice Brennan appeared to include an
express limitation of his adoption of Justice Powell's opinion in his own opinion in
Bakke, writing "We also agree with Mr. Justice POWELL that a plan like the "Harvard"
plan... is constitutional under our approach at least so long as the use of race to achieve
an integratedstudent body is necessitatedby the lingering effects ofpast discrimination."
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
This excerpt from Justice Brennan's opinion seems at odds with the Ninth Circuit's
assertion in Smith. See Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199. The Fifth Circuit specifically declined
to follow the Smith rationale, and further disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's practice of
reading the Supreme Court's "fragmented opinions like tea leaves, attempting to divine
what the Justices "would have" held." Id. at 275 n.66. Instead, the Fifth Circuit asserted
that "in the absence of subsequent Supreme Court precedent squarely and unequivocally
holding that diversity can never be a compelling state interest, we read Bakke as not
foreclosing (but certainly not requiring) the acceptance by lower courts of diversity as a
compelling state interest." Id.
48. Hopwood, 236 F.3d at 274.
49. M. Wood, Grutter Will Likely End Affirmative Action, Forde-MazruiPredicts,at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2003-spr/affaction.htm (last visited
on Jan. 15, 2005).
50. Hopwood, 236 F.3d at 275.
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including those involving the University of Michigan's race-conscious
admissions program. 51
Grutter presented the justices with a scenario very similar to the one
that the Court had declined to examine in Hopwood.5 2 A white Michigan
resident, Barbara Grutter, was rejected from the University of Michigan
Law School. 3 She claimed that Michigan's admissions program gave
minority applicants "a significantly greater chance of admission than
students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups, ' 54 and as
a result violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor conceded that "racial
classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so
dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest
demands. 5 6 Despite this clear acknowledgement of the risk presented
by such programs, the Court determined that Michigan's stated goal of
enrolling a "critical mass" '57 of underrepresented minority students was a
compelling interest, and that the race-conscious admissions program
utilized at Michigan was narrowly tailored to achieve this goal.58 As a
result of this determination, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
59
opinion, 9 thus conferring
constitutionality upon the program at issue. 60
Grutterhas been widely condemned in academic circles on a variety
of grounds. Some scholars have critiqued the Court's "narrow tailoring,"
analysis to with regard to the University of Michigan's program,6 1 while
others have gone so far as to deem the Court's assertion that racial
preference programs will not be necessary in twenty-five years "pure

51. Wood, supra note 49.
52. Hopwood, 236 F.3d 256.
53. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 317-18.
56. Id. at 342.
57. Id. at 318. One of the more interesting justifications for race-based admissions
policies is the "critical mass" concept, which, as described in Grutter, is the notion that
when a certain amount of minority students are enrolled at a particular educational
institution, those minority students feel less isolated and thus more likely to participate in
the classroom. Justice Scalia opined that this rationalization "for [the University of
Michigan's] discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible mind." Id. at 34647 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 343.
59. Id. at 343-44.
60. Id. at 343 (specifically noting that "the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body").
61. See Crump, supra note 19, at 485.
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fantasy., 62 Criticism of Grutter has not been limited to the Court's legal
analysis or simply the terminology utilized in the opinion. Arguments
have been made that the ideology and policy explicitly and implicitly
endorsed by the Grutter opinion are antithetical to the true aim of higher
education. 63 Since Grutter, it has been asserted that the Court has
catered to the elusive concept of "diversity" at the expense of both
meritorious applicants and, in the end, meritorious universities and
colleges.64
Even more fundamentally, many critics of the Supreme Court's
handling of the case look no further than the dissents in the case itself for
ample ammunition with which to attack the majority's Grutter opinion.6 5
This list of critiques is by no means exhaustive. It is meant simply to
illustrate that the Grutter opinion has come under fire for both its legal
analysis and its implicit and explicit endorsement of race-conscious
admissions policies.
As the Court's rhetoric and level of applied scrutiny in Grutterhave
come under fire from the nation's legal intelligentsia, a spectator to
America's affirmative action debate is left to wonder whether there exists
a suitable compromise which both supporters and detractors of raceconscious admissions programs would accept. The answer may be found
across the ocean, in the oft-troubled region of Northern Ireland.
III. The MacBride Principles: Background
The MacBride Principles 66 are a modern effort by the Catholic

62.

Lino A. Graglia, From Brown to Grutter: Affirmative Action in Higher

Education in the South, 78 TuL. L. REv. 2037, 2043 (2004).
63. See Laurence Thomas, Equality and the Mantra of Diversity, 72 U. CIN. L. REv.

931, 931 (2004).
64. "Not too long ago, it seems, attracting and training talented minds was held to
be the very essence of a university. And a positive correlation was thought to
hold between the quality of a university and the quality of the students that it
attracted. There were perhaps other aims. However, these aims were clearly
thought to be subordinate to the aim of attracting and training talented minds."
Id.
Professor Thomas argues that those who have elevated the concept of "diversity" to
its present status are misguided; indeed in rebutting University of Michigan President
Mary Sue Coleman's claim, following the announcement of the Grutter decision, that
"[o]ur diversity is our strength," id. Professor Thomas contends that "[ojur greatest
strength lies not in our diversity, but in our wherewithal to look beyond a person's
physical features or background to the forms of excellences that the individual's life
exhibits and then to exercise our moral power of affinmation." Id. at 958.
65. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist termed the University of Michigan Law
School's plan "a naked effort to achieve racial balancing." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
66. See McManus, The MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11.
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67
minority in their lengthy struggle against the Protestant majority' s
68
repressive and systematic discrimination in Northern Ireland. In order
to understand why the institution of the MacBride Principles was a
necessary measure for Catholics to ensure acceptable working

conditions, it is first necessary to understand, in very broad and general

terms, the Catholic-Protestant history and dynamic in Northern Ireland.
The conflict in Northern Ireland is, rather simplistically stated, a
struggle for control 69 over Ulster, 70 a disputed territory which the British
seized in the partition of Ireland following the Easter Rising by Irish
republicans in 1916.71 The partition effectively dissolved six counties
from the existing nine-county province of Ulster,72 leaving their
respective citizens under British rule, and creating the area now
commonly known as "Northern Ireland." The Protestant portion of the
population approved of England's continued governance of Northern
Ireland, while the Catholics by-and-large sought self-governance.7 3
Northern Ireland consists of a decidedly Protestant majority and a
Catholic minority.74 The divide between Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland is not simply religious; 75 instead, religious affiliation
serves as an ethnic marker of sorts, and conveys everything from a
person's local community to their perceived political affiliation.76 The
religious divide has historically been at its greatest with respect to the
topic of Northern Ireland's existence under British rule. While issues of
67. See Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes For Transnational
Corporations:What Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles Tell Us?, 19 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 167, 178-9 (1999).
68. Id. at 179.
69. It is almost unnecessary to note that the conflict in Northern Ireland is
multifaceted, and far more complex than a simple land control issue; however, for the
purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to note that both Catholics and Protestants in
Northern Ireland feel entitled to the disputed land for very different reasons. A detailed
history of the Catholic-Protestant dynamic in Northern Ireland would warrant a very
lengthy exploration in and of itself, and is therefore not feasible in this Comment.
70. The area known Ulster is made up of nine counties: Donegal, Cavan, Monaghan,
Fermanagh, Tyrone, Derry, Antrim, Down and Armagh. Ireland by Region: the
Counties, at http://www.irelandwide.com/regional/ulster/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
71. Jane Winter & Natasha Parassram Concepcion, CurrentHuman Rights Concerns
Arising From The Conflict and Peace Process in Northern Ireland, 9 No. 2 HUM. RTS.
BRIEF 6, 6 (2002).
72. See Conway, supra note 12, at 2.
73. McCrudden, supra note 67 at 178-79. Ireland itself operated under a system of
self-governance, separate and distinct from English supervision. Id.
74. Id.
75. Dominic Bryan, Parading Protestants and Consenting Catholics In Northern
Ireland: Communal Conflict, Contested Public Space, and Group Rights, 5 CI. J. INT'L
L. 233, 236 (2004) ("To put it at its most basic, when one teenage boy throws a stone at
others, it is usually because they represent 'the other community'; he does not do it
because of disagreements over theological issues such as transubstantiation.").
76. Id.
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national affiliation clearly were (and still are) of paramount importance
to Catholics in Northern Ireland at the time of the partition, other issues,
such as equality in employment, housing, and education, have also
become increasingly relevant." The increase in the importance of what
once were ancillary issues is due in large part to the systematic economic
discrimination that the Catholic
minority suffered at the hands of the
78
governing Protestant majority.
Outside of the topic of self-governance and British imperialism, one
of the most oft-complained issues regarding the Protestant oppression of
Catholics was that of employment discrimination. 7 9 The employment
statistics in many companies in Northern Ireland, when analyzed in terms
of religious demographics of those companies' employees, are
staggering. In 1983, before efforts had begun in full to address the
discriminatory practices, Shorts Brothers PLC, which touts itself as the
"world's oldest aircraft manufacturer," 80 employed a workforce of 6,300,
less than 5% of whom were Catholic. 8' In 1990, even after antidiscrimination efforts were well in place, A.S. Baird LTD, an automaker,
maintained a workforce in Northern Ireland made up of only 18%
Catholic workers.82
A.

The Conception and Implementation of the MacBride Principles

These statistics are far from anomalous.83 The assertion that
Catholics in Northern Ireland have been continually subjected to
discrimination at the hands of the Protestant employers is hardly a
controversial one.84 While this widely acknowledged discrimination, in
77. See McCrudden, supra note 67 at 179.
78. Id.
79. Jane Hyatt Thorpe, Note, God, Labor, and the Law: The Pursuit of Religious
Equality in Northern Ireland's Workforce, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719, 731 (1998).
"The effects of the hostility between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern
Ireland have been most obvious in the distribution of employment opportunities."
80. Shorts Brothers PLC website, at http://www.nics.gov.uk/irtu/research/
engineering-4.html (last visited on Jan. 15, 2005).
81. See Fr. Sean McManus, The MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, at
http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/pages/MacBride/MacBride%2OPrinciples%2OGenesi
s%20and%20History.htm. (last visited Jan 15, 2005).
82. Id.
83. See McCrudden, supra note 67 at 180. The British government seemingly
acknowledged the disparity in employment opportunities between Protestants and
Catholics in Ireland with Parliament's passing of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland)
Act in 1976.
84. See Sed.n Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Forces of Ethnopolitical
Conflict in Northern Ireland and Qudbec, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 741, 744 (2002)
(noting that under the 1692 Penal Laws, enacted in the era of Protestant dominance
following William of Orange's victory at the battle of Boyne, "Catholics could not be
elected to political office, practice their religion, speak the Gaelic language in public, or
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and of itself, is rather disconcerting, perhaps more disturbing is the
knowledge that many American companies were subsidizing these
discriminatory practices by continuing to do business in Northern Ireland
despite the discrimination practiced by the Protestant majority.
The awareness that many American companies engaged in
discriminatory hiring practices and maintained overwhelmingly
Protestant workforces in Northern Ireland spurred the Irish National
Caucus (INC) to open an office in Washington, D.C., in 1978.85 Once
the issue was brought to the attention of the United States Congress, Rep.
86
Ben Gilman, a Republican Congressman from New York,
commissioned the INC to investigate United States companies' business
practices in Northern Ireland.87 The INC investigators requested labor
information from American companies, including employment statistics
with regard to the religious composition of their labor forces. 88 That
investigation led to a hearing in front of the Ad Hoc Congressional
Committee for Irish Affairs on July 22, 198 1.89 This marked the first
time that the United States Congress had ever held a hearing to address
the issue of religious discrimination by American companies in Northern
Ireland. 90
The formation of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish
Affairs, combined with the hearing held by the Committee, as well as the
continued lobbying efforts of the INC, led to the introduction of House
Resolution 346591 in 1983.92 The bill, sponsored by Congressman Dick
Ottinger, 93 a Democrat from New York, 94 required that any organization
operating in Northern Ireland which employed more than twenty people
adhere to four basic fair employment principles: (1) desegregation in
any employment facility; (2) equal employment for all employees;
(3) equal pay for equal work; and (4) an increase in the representation of
individuals from underrepresented religious groups in managerial,
bequeath property unless the heir converted to the Protestant faith").
85. See MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supra note 81.
86. Congressman Gilman's interest in issues in Northern Ireland stems largely from
the concerns of his constituency. See Tom Kenworthy, Unity Eludes Hill's IrishAmericans on Thorny Ulster Question, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1990 at A4. His district
includes "a large and politically active Irish-American community." Id.
87. See MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supra note 81.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Northern Ireland Fair Employment Practices Act, H.R. 3465 (1983), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
92. Id.
93. Id. The Bill became known as the "Ottinger Bill," after its sponsor, Dick
Ottinger.
94. Id.
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supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs. 95
The tenets of employment equality in the "Ottinger Bill" were
modeled after the Sullivan Principles. 96 The Sullivan Principles 97 were
created by the Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, an American, in 1977 as a
way to "end discrimination against blacks in the workplace in South
Africa,, 98 which had been fostered for decades by apartheid. Rev.
Sullivan later amplified his original work99 to create the Global Sullivan
Principles,100 a broader and more far-reaching set of guidelines designed
95. Id.
96. MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supra note 81.
97. The Sullivan Principles,
at http://www.revleonsullivan.org/principled/
principles.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). The text of the Sullivan Principles is as
follows:
1. Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities.
2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period
of time.
4. Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in
substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory, administrative,
clerical, and technical jobs.
5. Increasing the number of blacks and other nonwhites in management and
supervisory positions.
6. Improving the quality of life for blacks and other nonwhites outside the work
environment in such areas as housing, transportation, school, recreation, and
health facilities.
7. Working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, economic, and
political justice. (Added in 1984.)
Id.
98. Leon Sullivan, Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility, at
http://globalsullivanprinciples.org/new-page_4.htm (last visited Jan 15, 2005).
99. Sullivan Principles for Corporate Accountability
Go Global, at
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article 135.html (last visited Jan 15, 2005).
100. Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility, Principles, at
http://globalsullivanprinciples.org/principles.htm (last visited Jan 15, 2005). The text of
the Global Sullivan Principles is as follows:
- Express our support for universal human rights and, particularly, those of our
employees, the communities within which we operate, and parties with whom
we do business.
- Promote equal opportunity for our employees at all levels of the company with
respect to issues such as color, race, gender, age, ethnicity or religious beliefs,
and operate without unacceptable worker treatment such as the exploitation of
children, physical punishment, female abuse, involuntary servitude, or other
forms of abuse.
- Respect our employees' voluntary freedom of association.
- Compensate our employees to enable them to meet at least their basic needs and
provide the opportunity to improve their skill and capability in order to raise
their social and economic opportunities.
- Provide a safe and healthy workplace; protect human health and the
environment; and promote sustainable development.
- Promote fair competition including respect for intellectual and other property
rights, and not offer, pay or accept bribes.
- Work with governments and communities in which we do business to improve

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

for application outside of South Africa and the apartheid structure.101
The similarities between the requirements set forth in the "Ottinger Bill"
and those in the Sullivan Principles are undeniable.
The "Ottinger Bill" contained what would become the essence of
the MacBride Principles. 10 2 INC leadership decided that the precepts4
10
13
enumerated in the "Ottinger Bill,"' with some revisions by the INC,

10 5
should be named after Dr. Sean MacBride, the INC Liaison in Ireland.
Dr. MacBride was an accomplished statesman and an ardent supporter of
equal opportunity employment policies in Northern Ireland. 10 6 His
credentials in issues of global peace and equal rights were impeccable.
After co-founding Amnesty International in 1961,107 Dr. MacBride won
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974108 and the Lenin Peace Prize in 1977.109

the quality of life in those communities-their educational, cultural, economic
and social well being-and seek to provide training and opportunities for
workers from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Promote the application of these Principles by those with whom we do business.

Id.
101. See Sullivan Principles for Corporate Accountability Go Global, supra note 99.
102. McManus, The MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supranote 81.
103. Id. The "Ottinger Bill" did not represent the totality of what would become the
MacBride Principles. The Irish National Caucus (INC) itself made changes to the Bill,
with input from some "expert advisors" at the office of New York City Comptroller
Harrison J. Goldin. Id. The most obvious changes are the addition of new points of
agreement, including the security requirement, and the banning of sectarian or political
emblems. Further, the language in the modem MacBride Principles has been clarified
greatly due to the amplifications provided in 1986 by Dr. Sean MacBride himself. See id.
104. There appears to be some discrepancy regarding who, in fact, was responsible
for the actual drafting of the MacBride Principles.
Noted scholar Christopher
McCrudden places credit for the drafting of the MacBride Principles with Harrison J.
Goldin, the former New York City Comptroller. See McCrudden, supra note 67 at 182.
More specifically, McCrudden asserts that Patrick Doherty, a staff member in the
Comptroller's office, drafted the final form of the Principles. Id. The INC, on the other
hand, while specifically acknowledging the contributions made by Comptroller Goldin's
office, specifically claims credit for the creation and drafting of the MacBride Principles.
McManus, The MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supra note 79. Refuting
assertions that Comptroller Goldin's office was responsible for the drafting of the
Principle, the INC posits this question:
If the Principles originated in Goldin's office [as many have reported] why
didn't Goldin-and not the Irish National Caucus-announce and launch the
MacBride Principles Campaign? It is really too much to believe that an
American politician would "originate" something and then "give" it to others to
announce.
Id.
105. Id.
106. See William G. Blair, Sean MacBride of IrelandIs Dead at 83, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1988, availableat 1988 WLNR 1319549.
107. Colman McCarthy, Sean MacBride's Testament, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1988,
availableat 1988 WL 2075160.
108. See The Norwegian Nobel Institute, List of Laureates, availble at
http://www.nobel.no/eng-lau list.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). Dr. MacBride, who
was honored for his work as President of the International Peace Bureau in Geneva and
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After Dr. MacBride agreed to lend his name to the cause, the INC
announced the launching of the MacBride Principles during the first
week of November, 1984.110 News of the Principles soon reached New
York City, prompting City Councilmember Sal Albanese to contact the
INC regarding the possibility of introducing a "MacBride Bill" in the
New York City Council."' On December 19, 1984, the Bill was
introduced. 112 The Bill met significant resistance, including opposition
from Mayor Ed Koch. 1 3 At around the same time as the introduction of
the New York City Council Bill, the INC succeeded in passing the
MacBride Principles into Massachusetts state law with the assistance of
Massachusetts State Senator Billy Bulger. 1 4 New York soon5 followed
suit, and in 1986 the state passed the Principles into state law."
Support for the MacBride Principles was not limited to the state
level. In 1986, Congressman Hamilton Fish, Jr., a Republican of New
York, and Senator Alfonse D'Amoto, also a New York Republican, each
116
introduced "MacBride Bills" into their respective houses of Congress.
The companion Bills were each known as the "Northern Ireland Fair
Employment Practices Act." ' 1 7 The introduction of these bills paved the
way for even greater support of the MacBride Principles, which would
occur on a more national scale.
The support for the MacBride Principles has grown as exposure to
the issue of employment discrimination in Northern Ireland and the
plight of the Catholic worker has increased. As of January, 2001, more
than 50 American companies have agreed in writing to "make all lawful
efforts to implement the Fair Employment Practices embodied in the
MacBride Principles in their Northern Ireland operations," ' 118 including
such corporate giants as AT&T, DuPont, Ford Motor Company, General
Motors, IBM, McDonald's Corporation, Phillip Morris, Proctor &
as the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, shared Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
honors that year with Eisaku Sato, the former Prime Minister of Japan.
109.

Alexander Cockburn, Viewpoint: Sean MacBride: The Man Who Smelled a Rat,

WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1988, availableat 1988 WL-WSJ 470785.
110. See MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supra note 81.
111. Id. The Bill was 0878-1984.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. New York State Legislature website, Laws of New York, at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi?COMMONQUERY=LAWS
(last visited
Jan 15, 2004). The MacBride Principles, now passed into New York State law, are
codified as New York City Administrative Code § 6-115.1. Id.
116. See Northern Ireland Fair Employment Practices Act, H.R. 5627 (1986)
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2005); see also Northern Ireland
Fair Employment Practices S.2909 (1986). Id.
117. Id.
118. MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11.
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Gamble, Sun Healthcare, Texaco, Verizon, Viacom, Westinghouse
Electric and Xerox Corporation.' 1 9 Legislation based on the MacBride
Principles, which serves to codify the Principles into local law, has been
passed in more than 25 cities and counties across the United States,
including Cleveland, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Boston, Detroit, New York
1 20
City, Washington D.C., and Chicago.
B. Supportfrom the AFL-CIO: A MacBride Ally in Theory and
Practice
One group that has been consistently vocal regarding its support of
the MacBride Principles is the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).
The AFL-CIO's
support for the Principles is logical; the AFL-CIO, which counts more
than 13 million American workers and more than 60 unions among its
members,121 supported the Principles due to the equal hiring provisions
that the Principles set forth. The AFL-CIO even went so far as to include
MacBride compliance on the labor group's "scorecard" for money
management firms that handle union pension investments.122 The AFLCIO has expressed the view that by making corporate MacBride
compliance and non-compliance more readily identifiable, investing the
AFL-CIO retirement assets of approximately $350 billion 23 can be
24
achieved without undermining Irish laborers in North Ireland. 1
This labor-friendly strategy is in accord with the Principles
themselves; the AFL-CIO plan of bringing an inequality before the
public for scrutiny and debate, and then using whatever leverage the
group may possess to exert subtle pressure on those in power to make the
desired changes is very similar to the way in which the INC brought
about the MacBride Principles themselves. The INC initially brought the
disparity in employment opportunities between Protestants and Catholics
in Northern Ireland to light in America, then, with the assistance of the
Ad Hoc Committee for Irish Affairs, continued to voice opposition to the
employment practices of major American corporations doing business in
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations website,
at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
122. Frank Swoboda, Organized Labor to Keep 'Scorecard' on Pension Fund
Managers,WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1999, at E3, availableat 1999 WL 2200527.
123. See id. "The unions hope to use the power of their retirement funds to curb
executive compensation, force independence on corporate boards, and make companies
do rightfor labor both at home and abroad." (emphasis added).
124. See id. (Bill Patterson, director of the AFL-CIO's Office of Investment, stated
"What we're trying to do is encourage funds to develop a view of shareholder value. I
think this will be a factor in how money managers are selected.")
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Northern Ireland. Finally, the INC was successful in effecting change
through state, city, and county MacBride legislation, and by garnering
the support of numerous major American corporations with a presence in
Northern Ireland that agreed to adhere to the MacBride Principles.
C. The Unique Nature of the MacBride Principles
The most unique, and perhaps the most brilliant, aspect of the
MacBride Principles, 25 is that standing alone, they do not carry the force
of law. 126 The Principles owe their origin to a private group, and
therefore are not binding. 127 They were drafted to represent non-binding
"admonitions,"1 28 which served as opportunities for large corporations to
demonstrate their commitment to the concept of equal opportunity
129
employment and social responsibility in an international context.
The success of these corporate guidelines depends wholly upon
voluntary international corporate acceptance and compliance with terms
set forth by the code of corporate conduct. In essence, the MacBride
Principles require multinational corporations to possess and exercise (in
an optimistic sense) a conscience, or a semblance of social responsibility.
A more cynical (and perhaps more realistic) view is that the general
public, acting both as consumer and lobbyist, can exert enough pressure
on multinational corporations so that those corporations will, in the
financial and economic interest of the corporation itself, be obliged to
sign the Principles and act in accordance therewith.
It is this intriguing aspect of the MacBride Principles-that is, a
system based entirely on voluntary compliance with a broad set of
guidelines designed to truly foster a system of equality not in outcome
but only in opportunity--which serves as an excellent model on which to
base a new policy regarding American affirmative action.
IV.

Instituting the MacBride Principles in Higher Education
Admissions Programs in the United States

Endeavoring to apply a set of corporate guidelines originally
designed to rectify religious discrimination in the Northern Irish labor
sector to American higher education admissions programs is, at first, an
admittedly daunting proposition. Indeed, the MacBride Principles were
125. McManus, The MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supra note 81.
126. See McCrudden, supra 67 at 183. The voluntary corporate guidelines model
originated with the Sullivan Principles, from which the MacBride Principles drew
inspiration in both form and content. See MacBride Principles: Genesis and History,
supra note 75.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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created in an effort to halt discriminatory labor practices,13 ° while
American affirmative action programs were created to allow those in
historically underrepresented minority groups opportunities for which
they may not otherwise qualify. 131 However, despite their acknowledged
differences in origin, the MacBride Principles represent a viable
mechanism32 to improve a system which has been the target of great
criticism.

A.

Why the MacBridePrinciples Represent a Better Policy Choice than
Grutter

The MacBride Principles represent an improvement over the current
American system of racial preference in higher education admissions on
a philosophical level because they truly embody the ideal of equality;
33
they serve as an inclusionary force rather than an exclusionary barrier.'
130. Father Sean McManus, the President of the Irish National Caucus, the group
instrumental in the passage of the MacBride Principles in the United States, wrote that
the MacBride Principles were created to "stop United States dollars subsidizing antiCatholic discrimination in Northern Ireland," by raising awareness of the discriminatory
practices utilized by many American companies doing business in Northern Ireland.
MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11.
131. In a speech to the Stanford Faculty Senate, Stanford President Gerhard Casper
justified affirmative action programs with the following language:
Affirmative action is based on the judgment that a policy of true equal
opportunity needs to create opportunities for members of historically
underrepresented groups to be drawn into various walks of life from which they
might otherwise be shut out. Barriers continue to exist in society, and therefore
affirmative action asks us to cast our net more widely to broaden the
competition and to engage in more active efforts for locating and recruiting
applicants.
Gerhard Casper, Speech to the Faculty Senate, available at http://www.stanford
alumni.org/news/magazine/1996/sepoct/articles/casper.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
A similarly phrased rationale for the creation of affirmative action is given in the
Bakke opinion-affirmative action was designed for "one fixed purpose: to give the
Executive Branch of Government clear authority to terminate federal funding of private
programs that use race as a means of disadvantaging minorities in a manner that would be
prohibited by the Constitution if engaged in by government." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 329 (1978).
132. See infra discussion Part II.
133. See MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11. The language of the
Principles makes clear the INC's desire for the Principles not to create a diminished
opportunity for the Protestant majority. For example, MacBride Principle (4), which
calls for public advertisement of jobs and special recruitment efforts directed at minority
applicants specifically provides, "This should not be construed to imply a diminution of
opportunity for other applicants." Id. MacBride Principle (7) echoes this equality, and
calls for the creation of a training program for minority workers, noting, "This does not
imply that such programs should not be open to all members of the workforce equally."
Id. Further, MacBride Principle 8, which requires signatories to implement programs
designed to actively recruit minority applicants, notes, "This section does not imply that
such procedures should not apply to all employee equally." Id.
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This inclusionary function occurs in large part to the terminology and
phrasing of both the Principles themselves and the amplifications
subsequently issued by Dr. MacBride. 34 The carefully chosen language
of the MacBride Principles and the subsequent amplifications fail to
require preference for one group at the expense of any other; 35 indeed,
the Principles by their very terms forbid this sort of exclusionary
action. 136
Instead, the Principles call only for an absolute end to
discrimination, regardless of which group such discrimination is
purported to favor or assist. The INC recognized that in order to gain
support for a movement to end religious discrimination against the
Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, a set of policies explicating the
INC's aims had to be drafted in a manner that did not function to
discriminate against the majority in an attempt to redress past
inequities. 137 Instead, the INC drafted the MacBride Principles to require
only equality in opportunity. This equality of opportunity, and not
necessarily in outcome or result, is the type that should be the goal of a
society truly free of discrimination.
B. Benefits of a MacBride Approach Over the CurrentAmerican
System
The MacBride Principles represent the culmination of the evolution
of affirmative action policies across the world. The goal of affirmative
action policies, including both the MacBride approach and the
admissions system currently in place in American higher education, is to
create a society in which such policies are no longer necessary. The
MacBride Principles, therefore, represent a positive advancement for
affirmative action policies. The Principles are a step away from
programs steeped in race-consciousness, and a step closer to the creation
of an America in which all citizens believe that society has made
measurable progress, so much so that affirmative action programs are no
134. Id. The amplifications were issued in 1986.
135. See id. While the MacBride Principles suggest that the "representation of
individuals from underrepresented religious groups in the work force" be increased, there
exist nowhere in the Principles any request that preference be accorded to those
underrepresented groups. Instead, the Principles only call for "special recruitment
efforts" and the "abolition of job reservations."
Id. Further, "[a]pprenticeship
restrictions, and differential employment criteria which discriminate on the basis of
religion U.S. or ethnic origin." Id.
136. See id. The MacBride Principles are notable for the repeated assertion that those
who institute the Principles are not required to engage in preferential employment
practices: "This should not be construed to imply a diminution of opportunitiesfor other
employees." Id.
137. See id.
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longer necessary.
Perhaps the most ingenious aspect of the MacBride Principles (and
likely the most beneficial to American institutions of higher education) is
that while the Principles do request special action from employers
designed to increase the number of minority employees in the
workforce, 138 nowhere in the language of the Principles is any special
consideration accorded to religious minorities when employment
decisions are made. The fact that the Principles do not impose the
demand that religious affiliation play a part in hiring decisions allows for
employers to make their hiring decisions based on merit. This represents
a solution to a widely criticized aspect of American affirmative action
programs; namely, that the American system of affirmative action places
merit behind ethnic diversity in the hierarchy of importance and
desirability.13 9
Unlike the American system of affirmative action, the Principles
make the very logical supposition that by simply discouraging employers
in Northern Ireland from engagin in discriminatory practices, 140 and by
requiring those employers to develop and seek out qualified minority
applicants, 141 the representation of minority workers in the labor force
will naturally increase. In essence, the MacBride Principles serve to
encourage an increase in the number of viable minority applicants, which
will invariably lead to an increase in minority employment figures.
There exists in the MacBride Principles 42no semblance of the patriarchy
inherent in American affirmative action.1
A MacBride-based approach to ending race-consciousness has a
dual advantage over the approach currently utilized in American higher
education admissions. First, such a system would not require a college
138. Id. 4. All job openings should be publicly advertised and special recruitment
efforts should be made to attract applicants from underrepresented religious groups.
139. See Thomas, supra note 63.
140. See McManus, The MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11.
141. See id.
142. Interview by Peter Robinson with Shelby Steele, Hoover Institution Research
Fellow, at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/selections/962/steele.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005). Shelby Steele, vocal African-American critic of affirmative
action, noted this patriarchal effect in an interview with Hoover Institution research
fellow Peter Robinson, stating:
Affirmative action has created what I call a "culture of preference." It's not
just a benign social policy having to do with college admissions. It is a vast
and all-defining culture that continues to lock me in, as a black person, to a
victim-focused identity. Affirmative action makes me passive. It makes me
into someone who cannot move forward unless white people are benevolent
and help me move forward. It perpetuates dependency. I think affirmative
action is the greatest negative force-the greatest force in opposition to black
uplift-in society today."
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or university to discriminate against any applicant, regardless of their
ethnic status. Indeed, the MacBride Principles specifically note in the
amplification of Principle (4), that "This should not be construed to imply
a diminution of opportunitiesfor other employees.' 43 This requirement
would allay perhaps the single most widely utilized argument (and
perhaps the most litigated theory) 144 against affirmative action programs;
that is, all race-conscious admissions programs inherently work as
discriminatory barriers to admission for white students.
The MacBride Principles explicitly call for the end of
discriminatory employment practices in Northern Ireland.145 Calling for
a stop to discriminatory practices would seem to be a rather
uncontroversial step in creating a discriminatory-free society. However,
as previously discussed, present-day American colleges and universities
have instituted admissions policies ripe with discrimination. 146 Indeed,
the American concept of affirmative action is, somewhat ironically, held
by many to be a central tenet of modem racial egalitarianism, 147 and
perhaps even a weapon in the arsenal of those who claim to battle
discrimination.
If the MacBride Principles were implemented in the United States
within the context of the academic admissions practices, the reverse
discrimination which has long been a source of frustration for many
qualified white applicants 48 would, by the very language of the
Principles, cease. Applicants would be evaluated solely on merit, as
143. See MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11.
144. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Fetterman asserts that "reverse discrimination" suits
began in earnest with the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S 200 (1995). Joseph C. Fetterman, Affirmative Action Hiring Obligations;
Is It time For a Race Neutral Policy or a Race to the Court House?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J.
781, 784 (2004). For interesting discussion on the topic of "reverse discrimination" in
the realm of affirmative action programs in the United States, see David Schwartz, The
Case Of The Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections On Reverse Discrimination,
Affirmative Action, and Racial Balance, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 657 (2000).
145. MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11. "5. Layoff, recall and
termination procedures should not, in practice, favour particular religious groups. 6. The
abolition of job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions, and differential employment
criteria, which discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic origin."
146. See Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
147. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). As Justice Scalia further noted:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing
compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those
effects, which is the tendency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and
judge men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of
their skin. A solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no
solution at all.
Id. at 520-21 (emphasis added).
148. See Fetterman, supra note 142, at 784.
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determined in various ways by the admissions officers at each respective
university or college.
Second, a MacBride-based approach would remove the stigma
which has plagued minorities who have achieved success in America
while affirmative action programs have been in place. 149 A MacBridebased approach would allow everyone involved in any facet of American
higher education to know that each and every student on campus earned
their way into higher education, and that they stood on equal footing with
their peers.1 50
C. How Would a MacBride-BasedSystem Actually Be Implemented in
American HigherEducation?
This Comment has espoused the many benefits of the MacBride
Principles, from its policy of voluntary adherence to its focus on equality
in opportunity. While many would agree that such a policy is admirable
and desirable in theory, the application of the Principles to American
higher education admissions, at first glance, seems perhaps implausible.
Due to the skepticism that such a proposal would engender, the
feasibility of implementing a MacBride-based approach to American
admissions programs is an issue that merits exploration.
While initial skepticism may be prevalent to a MacBride-based
proposal, the more that such a possibility is explored, the more feasible
the scheme becomes. The MacBride Principles began with a lobbying
149. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758 (1980). In his dissent in a case
dealing with the "minority business enterprise" provision of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, Justice Stevens acknowledged the negative ramifications of
affirmative action programs on those whom the programs are designed to aid, writing
"But, even though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of this kind
inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted
this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their
race." Id. at 2809 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens is not alone in this
conclusion; three years before the Fullilove decision, Justice Brennan wrote that
"preferential treatment may act to stigmatize its recipient groups, for although intended to
correct systemic or institutional inequities, such policy may imply to some the recipients'
inferiority and especial need for protection." United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc.
v. Carey, 97 S.Ct. 996, 1013-14 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
150. See R.A. Lenhart, Understanding the Mark, Race, Stigma and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 902 (2004). Professor Lenhart observes that three main
arguments are generally made regarding stigma by critics of affirmative action. First,
critics of the program often liken the risk of racial stigmatization under present
affirmative action programs to the racial stigma created by segregated educational
practices. Second, minority students admitted under affirmative action programs are
often not as well-prepared as counterparts admitted under normal processes, and that this
can lead to demoralization and failure. This failure, it is argued, can then serve to
confirm any preexisting belief of minority inferiority. Finally, affirmative action
programs stigmatize and penalize minority students who were qualified enough to have
"made it" on their own merit without racial preference programs in place. Id. at 902-04.
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effort by a small group of committed individuals in Washington, D.C.'5 1
The terms of the Principles were subsequently agreed to by major
corporations due to the same lobbying effort. The Principles could
certainly take on an educational form1 52 with a similar lobbying
campaign.
151. See MacBride Principles: Genesis and History, supra note 81,
152. I acknowledge that the actual terminology of the MacBride Principles is not
wholly applicable to the admissions process. The language of the Principles is tailored to
function in an employment and labor context. Some points of the Principles would not
translate to American educational settings, in part because they may be unnecessary. For
example, Principle (2) deals with the security of minority workers. Clearly, some of the
terminology of the Principles would require alteration to allow for application in an
education arena. I would propose the following alternative form of the MacBride
Principles for use in higher education admissions programs (material alterations to the
applicable sections of the current MacBride Principles are italicized):
(1) Increasing the representation of individual, from underrepresented minority
groups in the student populationof the United States' colleges and universities.
A student body that is severely unbalanced may indicate prima facie that full
equality of opportunity is not being afforded all segments of the community in
the United States. Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make every
reasonable lawful effort to increase the representation of underrepresented
minority groups at all levels of education in America.
(2) Providing that all admissions opportunitiesbe advertised to all segments of
society and providing that special recruitment efforts be made to attract
applicants from underrepresented minority groups. Signatories to the MacBride
Principles must exert special efforts to attract employment applications from
the minority groups that are substantially underrepresented in the higher
education. This should not be construed to imply a diminution of opportunity
for other applicants.
(3) Providing that admissions procedures do not favor a particular racial or
ethnic group. Each signatory to the MacBride Principles must make reasonable
good faith efforts to ensure admissions procedures do not penalize racial or
ethnic groups disproportionately.
(4) Abolishing admissions reservations, quotas, and differential admissions
criteria which discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity. Signatories to the
MacBride Principles must make reasonable good faith efforts to abolish all
differential employment criteria whose effect is discrimination on the basis of
race or ethnicity.
(5) Providing for the development of academic assistance programs that will
prepare substantial numbers of minority applicants for admission to colleges
and universities, including the expansion of existing programs and the creation
of new programs to assist and improve the skills of minority applicants. This
does not imply that such programs should not be open to all members of the
applicantpool equally.
(6) Establishing procedures to assess, identify and actively recruit minority
applicants with the potential for admission and academic success. This section
does not imply that such procedures should not apply to all applicantsequally.
(7) Providing for the appointment of a senior admissions staff member to be
responsible for the recruitment efforts of the college or university and, within a
reasonable period of time, the implementation of the principles described
above. In addition to the above, each signatory to the MacBride Principles is
required to report annually to an independent monitoring agency on its progress
in the implementation of these Principles.
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A concentrated lobbying effort could convince an American college
or university that a MacBride-based admissions program is superior to
the present system. The college or university would then agree to cease
its present affirmative action efforts in favor of a MacBride-based
approach. Next, the institution would voluntarily agree to be bound, in
good faith, to the Principles. The institution would then, in accordance
with the requirements of the Principles, appoint a staff member to
oversee the recruitment efforts mandated in the Principles. This staff
member would then report to an independent monitoring agency
regarding the college's or university's successful adherence to the
program.
Whether a MacBride-based program thrives is a function of how
successful such a program turns out to be in achieving the aims of its
signatories. If the program is successful in its application, then it is
logical that other colleges and universities would implement such a
program. If it is not, then it would represent no more than a failed
attempt at improving a flawed system.
D. MacBride: A Lossfor ProponentsofAffirmative Action?
If the application of race-blind admissions standards were the only
aspect of the MacBride Principles implementation to American colleges
and universities, then it would seem that those who have derided
affirmative action policies and called for their end would have achieved a
total victory. However, as the preceding pages have made clear, the
MacBride Principles in their labor and employment context represent a
two-prong solution to discriminatory practices. The requirement that
signatory corporations end current discriminatory practices in hiring and
promotion"' serves to rectify the problems of current discrimination.
That obligation is coupled with the condition that signatory corporations
must engage in affirmative efforts to target, recruit, and prepare qualified
individuals in underrepresented groups for employment, 15 4 which serves
to rectify any negative lingering effects of past discrimination.
Thus, while the implementation of a MacBride-based approach to
higher education admissions would seem to signal a rather lopsided
victory for critics of current affirmative action policies in higher
education, it is the second prong of the MacBride approach that
represents the nexus of both the compromise and the solution. Indeed,
this requirement serves as both the impetus for those who deem
affirmative action programs still necessary in American society to accept

153.
154.

See MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11.
Id.
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the program, and as the means by which to totally phase-out raceconsciousness in collegiate admissions decisions.
E. The Phase-Out
In the Grutter majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote "We
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." 155 While her
belief that the policies approved of in Grutter will lead to a society in
which affirmative action is deemed no longer necessary is, perhaps,
tenuous, 156 it indicates that the Supreme Court does acknowledge that
race conscious admissions policies should not, and cannot, exist into
perpetuity. This proclamation from Justice O'Connor should represent a
victory for both sides of the affirmative action debate; those who think
race conscious policies have no place in American society will see the
end of affirmative action, and those who have long seen race preference
programs as a necessary measure to combat the lingering effects of
racism in American culture can take heart in the knowledge that the
United States is presently more free of racism than at any time in the
nation's past.
Justice O'Connor's statement regarding the future of affirmative
action, as well as the erosion of affirmative action policies in the years
since Bakke,' 57 indicate with relative certainty that race conscious
policies in American higher education will, perhaps within the lifetime of
today's college students, become a thing of the past. It is therefore
necessary to determine the best way to "phase-out" a program that has
become so entrenched in American education.
The MacBride Principles represent a logical mechanism by which to
bring about an unequivocal end to discrimination in admissions in the
future. This phase-out will be possible due specifically to the "prepare
and recruit" philosophy embodied in the MacBride Principles. The
"prepare aspect" of the Principles is best illustrated by MacBride
Principle (7), which requires companies to undertake:
"It]he
development of training programmes that will prepare substantial
numbers of current minority employees for skilled jobs, including the
expansion of existing programmes and the creation of new programmes
158
to train, upgrade and improve the skills of minority employees."'
The "recruit" function of the Principles is embodied in Principle (4),
155. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
156. See Graglia, supra note 62 at 2043.
157. Compare Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), with
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (2000).
158. Id.
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which requires that "[a]ll job openings should be publicly advertised and
special recruitment efforts should be made to attract applicants from
underrepresented religious groups., 159
The Principles themselves
therefore provide a mechanism designed to ensure that parity exists in
the opportunity to achieve, regardless of ethnic background.
Therefore, while it is undeniable that the MacBride Principles
specifically denounce preference in selection, calling for the abolition of
"all differential employment criteria whose effect is discrimination,"' 60
they specifically mandate assistance for minorities in both preparation
and recruitment. This allows for equality in opportunity.
Through these procedures, the minority applicant pool expands both
in terms of the number and quality of applicants. By undertaking these
measures, parity in education will result almost by default. Meritorious
applicants of all races and ethnicities will exist, and they will compete
for admission based on academic qualifications.
V.

Conclusion

The MacBride Principles represent a stark theoretical and
philosophical deviation from the current American policies approved of
in Grutter regarding race-conscious admissions programs.
While
American affirmative action programs in institutions of higher education
generally regard an applicant's minority background as a benefit to the
applicant in admissions decisions, and thus inherently regard a white
applicant's race as a disadvantage, the MacBride Principles explicitly
denote that any sort of preferential program would be antithetical to the
aim of equality towards which the Irish National Congress strives.
Instead, the MacBride Principles seek equality in its truest and
clearest form; equality of opportunity. If American colleges and
universities adopted a MacBride-based program, admissions decisions
could no longer be decried as racially based. Instead, meritorious
applicants, regardless of their race, would be granted admission to
American colleges and universities. Equally important, the patriarchy
intrinsic in affirmative action programs would be eradicated.
If the MacBride Principles were implemented in American
institutions of higher education in place of the present system of
affirmative action, many would argue that minority enrollment will
greatly suffer at the more selective schools. 61 This contention is not an
159. See McManus, The MacBride Principles: The Essence, supra note 11.
160. Id.
161. This argument is not without merit; in fact, after the University of California at
Berkeley altered its affirmative action program so as to be in accordance with Proposition
209 (a voter-based referendum banning racial preferences), the number of AfricanAmericans admissions to Berkeley plummeted by 66%. Steve Stecklow, Higher
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uncommon one. 162
In response to this assertion, Hoover Institution research fellow
Shelby Steele, an avowed critic of racial-preference policies, offers this
provocative query in response: "[w]ill blacks [and other minorities]
disappear from higher education? That is not a decision for white
163
Americans to make. That is a decision for black Americans to make."
The MacBride Principles, by providing for equality of opportunity,
allow individuals to determine their own academic destiny based on their
credentials, not their skin color. In an America in which MacBridebased admissions programs reigned supreme, merit would regain its
rightful place as the sole criterion on which admissions decisions are
made.

Yearning: College-Bound Senior Is in the Right Place But at the Wrong Time, WALL ST.
J. April 21, 1998, at Al.
162. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and DisparateImpact: Round Three,
117 HARv. L. REv. 493, 541 (2003) (asserting that the drop in nonwhite enrollment in the
wake of the Hopwood decision was predictable).
163. Interview by Peter Robinson with Shelby Steele, supra note 142.

